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Abstract 
Given the rapid development and ease of access to technology, the threat of 
extremist organizations utilizing cyberspace as a means to target critical American 
strategic infrastructure is of increasing concern. The risk posed by the acquisition of 
fissile material, sabotage, or use of a nuclear device by an extremist organization has 
been exasperated due to technological development outpacing strategy. Despite policy-
makers’ attempts to protect the public from cyber-attacks and nuclear terrorism, the 
federal policies in place have failed to account for the continual evolution of technology 
and the gaps in security that this advancement brings. Through examining documents 
from congressional and bureaucratic agencies using content analysis, this study examines 
whether or not policymakers, congressional or bureaucratic, use deterrence theory when 
they make policy, suggestions, rules, and guidelines. This thesis asks how U.S. policy 
regarding nuclear terrorism has changed given a rise in cyberthreats? This thesis also asks 
a second question: Which federal agency is most capable of dealing with cyberthreats 
concerning nuclear terrorism? The findings of this research concluded that as 
cyberthreats continued to develop, policymakers using deterrence theory shifted to using 
previous waves of deterrence theory, primarily dealing with rivalry and competitive 
threats. In addition, this research finds that intelligence agencies are the most capable 
federal agencies in proving guidelines and informing future policymakers.  
 
1 
Introduction 
 
Prior to 1995, the concept of a terrorist organization gaining hold of and using a 
nuclear device was based entirely within the theories of early nuclear security academics, 
military strategists, and in the ideas portrayed in popular novels and films. However, in 
1995 this changed when a nerve-gas similar to sarin was used to attack Tokyo’s subways, 
killing 13, seriously injuring 54, and affecting anywhere from estimates of 980 to 6,000 
other civilians, (Murakami, 2001). This attack was committed by Aum Shinrikyo, a 
Japanese cult centered on the concept of a nuclear apocalypse. Prior to the 1995 attack, 
Aum Shinrikyo had planned to buy a nuclear weapon, and later, as this failed, sought to 
purchase fissile material from an Australian mine, in which they became suspect. With 
plans to manufacture their own fissile material, this was scrapped as they felt the 
perceived pressure of authorities hunting them, instead opting to use a nerve agent. In 
truth, the authorities were not close to raiding Aum Shinrikyo because of its protection 
status as a religious group. Only once the attack had occurred and responsibility claimed 
by the nuclear-zealous cult, did authorities fully learn the extent and efforts made to 
commit a nuclear terrorism attack. The group had amassed over a billion dollars in bank 
accounts, operated an Australian farm where it practiced gassing sheep, owned a twelve-
acre chemical weapons factory, and claimed sixty thousand followers around the globe 
(Allison, 2004). After the sharing of information between Japanese and American 
authorities, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported to the U.S. Senate 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that the name of the 
group did not appear on any intelligence agency’s lists (Allison, 2004). 
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Given a rapidly growing proliferation of faster and more capable computing 
abilities globally, the ability to use cyber warfare as an irregular method for financing 
operations, gathering information, and performing attacks while maintaining anonymity, 
is a cost-effective ability many terrorist organizations seek to acquire. The relevance for 
terrorist organizations seeking to use such technology against U.S. assets has steadily 
increased over the last few decades. Similarly, the amount of non-state actors and 
designated terrorist organizations seeking to acquire fissile material, or nuclear weapons, 
has increased. Among this trend is a growing concern that the security of nuclear 
facilities and existing layers of countermeasures to prevent nuclear terrorism have the 
potential to be circumvented or weakened through the use of cyberspace. 
There has been a growing amount of cyber threats and cyber warfare capabilities 
from nation states, terrorist organizations, and even regular criminals, of which current 
policy and regulations are not informed of and not capable of dealing with effectively. 
The increase in these threats requires revisiting the effectiveness of policy and 
determining which federal policy-makers are best able to protect against the threat of 
nuclear terrorism given new vulnerabilities in the 21st century from the cyber realm. 
This paper seeks to answer two questions, filling the gaps in literature on how 
policy-makers are influenced by emerging threats and provide an update on the roles and 
responsibilities of federal agencies. First, how has U.S. policy regarding nuclear terrorism 
changed given a rise in cyberthreats? And, second, what federal agency is most capable 
of dealing with cyberthreats regarding nuclear terrorism? Answering these questions 
would contribute to the field of political science by addressing gaps in literature 
regarding the policy-making process of strategic security issues including nuclear 
3 
 
security, cybersecurity, and terrorism. To answer these questions, content analysis of 
congressional and executive documents on nuclear terrorism and cybersecurity were 
used. Using deterrence theory this thesis examines how U.S. policy has changed within 
federal institutions. This paper additionally addresses the ability of different federal 
agencies in their application or use of deterrence theory, including the ability for federal 
agencies to better inform U.S. policy produced by both congressional and bureaucratic 
agencies. Agencies are also evaluated in terms of their ability to address technological 
innovation and developments in the cyber realm in order to inform whether or not 
particular agencies are better suited to deal with cyber threats. Lastly, this paper 
concludes which federal agencies are the most forward-looking and most informed to be 
able to inform effective policy to meet the cybersecurity demands of the 21st century. 
The primary argument proposed is that as deterrence theory has evolved, so too has its 
use by policy-makers and the resulting policy it informs. In addressing the second 
question of identifying the most effective federal agency to deal with the future 
implementation of policies, this thesis argues that intelligence agencies necessitate a 
larger role in the policy-making process, as they possess the most relevant understandings 
and expertise of upcoming technological development and emerging threats to inform a 
more proactive approach to policy, while maintaining intelligence necessary to the 
successful performance of more reactive inter-agency policies. 
Background information is necessary for providing context for the content and 
research of this thesis. This includes the origins and history of nuclear terrorism as a 
threat and what cyber threats presently exist or are upcoming. The landscape of relevant 
academic literature from five fields are reviewed. These include the development of 
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deterrence theory, 4th wave deterrence as it is applied to both subjects of nuclear 
terrorism and cybersecurity, the skepticism movement within deterrence theory 
academia, a review of congressional and bureaucratic policy-making, and addressing the 
gap in literature that this paper will seek to fill. Following this, content analysis of 18 
documents spanning between 1957 and 2018, including congressional hearings, executive 
statements, reports, reviews will be examined, using deterrence theory as the framework 
to address how U.S. policy regarding nuclear security has changed with an increase in 
cyber threats. These documents were examined again, using content analysis, to 
determine the best equipped agencies to tackle the future of the asymmetric threats of 
cyber and nuclear terrorism, and ultimately answer the two primary questions that drive 
this thesis and support the argument presented.  
Background & Key Terms 
 
 In order to have better knowledge of the context and understandings of the 
content of this thesis, it is important to address the key terms of nuclear terrorism and 
cyber threats, and what parameters exist within each of them for the purposes of this 
paper. The concept of nuclear terrorism, or the use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist 
organization, has varied in defining criteria in policy and academia. According to a 2016 
report the three events that consolidate the study of nuclear terrorism is the buying, 
stealing, or construction of a nuclear weapon, the use of a dirty bomb utilizing 
radiological matter, or the sabotage of nuclear facilities (Bun, 2016; Eaves, 2018). This 
will be the criteria in which nuclear terrorism is looked at as a threat. Although 
cybersecurity and information security are often used interchangeably, the concept of 
cybersecurity goes beyond the traditional realm of looking at protecting resources and 
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data affiliated with institutions, corporations, and governments. Rather, it addresses 
humans as potential targets as well as other assets that can be manipulated or controlled 
electronically (Solms, 2013).  
Types of Cyber Threats 
Cyber threats and their impacts are not widely understood by the general public 
and can come in various shapes and sizes, utilizing different tactics and dependencies to 
attack a target. There are three distinct categories of cyber threats, all of which can target 
consumers to entire government and defense systems depending upon the type and scale 
of the attack. These include Phishing, Malware, and other new or hybrid threats, 
including a variety of traditional and upcoming technological developments and attack 
methods that do not necessarily fit into the other sections or function as a collective. 
Cyber threats such as phishing are an increasingly popular tool used against 
consumers. Phishing can be utilized in multiple ways to fit supporting a nuclear terrorism 
agenda. Phishing utilizes social engineering, often by establishing trust over time or 
posing as another ranking official with key targeted personnel or individuals. These 
attacks are normally executed by having a targeted individual receive a link through 
email, or text, that they believe to be legitimate, but actually contains a variety of 
malicious software. This software could be used to hold systems hostage for ransom, 
persuade employees to make irregular alterations that they believe to be legitimate, install 
malware, or  reveal sensitive information, This attack is common at the consumer level in 
identity theft and monetary transfers, and is also commonly used to access government 
facilities by targeting key personnel, allowing for a doorway to future attacks against an 
agency or layer of security. This usually is the first step in an Advanced Persistent Threat 
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or APT attack, involving the installation of malware, or monitoring software, that can 
remain dormant or undetectable for an extended period. This is a favorable method of 
cyberwarfare by nation states and state-backed organizations, including known terrorist 
groups (Bonn, 2015). Phishing acts essentially as providing a gateway to future attacks. 
The second category of cyber threat that exists in both the consumer and 
government world is that of Malware. Malware is similar to software in that it can 
maintain a dormant state to avoid initial detection or slowly eat away at the integrity of a 
system. It does not require permission to be installed and can serve a variety of functions, 
including taking control or monitoring actions of a computer system. Malware differs 
from software in that it has the capacity to be deployed into a singular computer system 
that can be initially infected, however move throughout a connected network to further 
systems, able to spread rapidly without detection. Ransomware is a form of malware that 
restricts access to a user’s system, with threats of making data public or deleting it unless 
financial or political demands are met. Another variation of malware is the Trojan Horse, 
in which, as the name suggests, the malware is disguised as a piece of legitimate or 
popular software that is unknowingly functioning to compromise its target (Brenner, 
2009). 
The third category of cyber threats varies in its applications and threat perception, 
but includes some of the most commonly utilized threats by terrorist organizations, as 
well as some of the most sought after upcoming cyber capabilities. Denial of Service 
(DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a method of cyber-attack that is 
executed by sending an abundant amount of traffic or information, causing the targeted 
system or service to freeze, and result in not being able to be used. This has been 
7 
 
commonly employed to target consumers as well as the general public and has also been 
used extensively against government websites and entire state infrastructures to deny 
critical services, or actions, from being able to take place (Edelman, 2019). 
Eavesdropping is a form of attack that allows access to key information through 
intercepting unsecure signals used to communicate between systems or devices or 
breaking an encryption to do so. In the context of Nuclear Security, compromising 
Nuclear Command and Control and Communications (NC3) is the primary case in which 
this may be employed (Futter, 2016; Futter, 2018; Dye 2019). Password attacks are the 
data variant of Eavesdropping, focusing on decrypting login information in order to 
legitimately access systems. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) is a common form of attack in 
which an attacker is able to monitor, control, or alter the flow of information between 
individuals and systems, a cyber threat that allows for two or more legitimate personnel 
to potentially be led to act in favor of an aggressor’s agenda. An Insider threat is a cyber 
threat in which an individual or employee who has legitimate access to a computer 
system, network, or server installs malware to sabotage systems they have been granted 
access to. These are particularly damaging as the individual may be aware of the network 
structure and policies of the agency they are damaging, allowing for maximum threat 
while potentially remaining undetected (Jajodia, 2014). 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) attacks are attacks featuring an independent malicious 
attacker deploying to computer systems, infrastructure, and other electronically 
connected assets, that has the ability to learn and adapt to obstacles to fulfill its mission in 
engaging a target. This is perhaps most notably known through the deployment of the 
Stuxnet worm to target Iran’s nuclear development program in 2010 by targeting 
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centrifuges to malfunction during the process of the enrichment of nuclear material 
(Bunn, 2016). Since Stuxnet, the United States and allied nations have deployed similar 
AI cyber-attacks against other states. However, this technology is being developed and 
becoming more acquirable by competing nations and potentially their proxy 
organizations, representing a serious threat to U.S. infrastructure. Lastly, and perhaps the 
most forward-looking form of a cyber-attack can be found in the form of quantum 
computing. Although quantum computing promises untold speeds of data and secure 
encryption, the technology could also be used harmfully (Edelman, 2019). Previous 
methods of encryption could be rendered obsolete given the access of this capability to an 
attacker. This means that previously secure government assets and well protected systems 
are just as vulnerable as their unsecure consumer counterparts, with particular 
implications for the majority of U.S. national security systems (Futter, 2016). Quantum 
computing in the hands of a bad actor could compromise defense systems and layers of 
security to such an extent that many consider the race to fully incorporating quantum 
computing to be critical to the securing and maintaining a state’s position as a 
superpower in an ever more technology-dependent social, economic, political, and 
security environment. 
According to a GAO report from 2013, the source of these adversarial threats to 
cybersecurity are not always terrorists, which it notes “seek to destroy, incapacitate, or 
exploit critical infrastructures in order to threaten national security, cause mass casualties, 
weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence. Terrorists may use 
phishing schemes or spyware/malware in order to generate funds or gather sensitive 
information” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013, 5). While cyber threats 
9 
 
could be used by terrorists to directly attack a target or as a means to garner the means to 
operate, terrorists can also work in tandem, hire, or work for a number of other 
adversarial threats. These include, bot-network operators, those who control 
compromised networks and remote systems to perform phishing, malware, and denial-of-
service attacks. Criminal groups and organized crime can work to mask terrorist activity 
or provide a source of funding through various methods of attack and espionage. In 
addressing hackers, the same report states that “According to the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the large majority of hackers do not have the requisite expertise to threaten 
difficult targets such as critical U.S. networks. Nevertheless, the worldwide population of 
hackers poses a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption causing serious 
damage” (U.S. GAO, 2013, 5). Insiders are a threat that is particularly concerning, with 
infiltration by terrorist organizations possible as well as contractors, disgruntled 
employees, and poorly trained employees acting as accessible methods of using a pre-
established user to access sensitive systems. Individuals can be hired or used by terrorist 
groups who maintain expertise in phishing, spamming, and authors of malware/spyware 
who can be used to execute attacks.  
Lastly, the report stresses the capabilities of nations as being major adversarial 
threats to cybersecurity, stating “Nations use cyber tools as part of their information-
gathering and espionage activities. In addition, several nations are aggressively working 
to develop information warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities 
enable a single entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply, 
communications, and economic infrastructures that support military power - impacts that 
could affect the daily lives of citizens across the country. In his January 2012 testimony, 
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the Director of National Intelligence stated that, among state actors, China and Russia are 
of particular concern” (U.S. GAO, 2013, 5). The capabilities of nations are problematic 
as cyberspace allows for a space in which providing proof and effective sanctions barely 
exists. Although both Russia and China have been known to engage in cyber-attacks 
against other nations, the operations are largely inter-state military cyber-conflicts or 
measures of influence. However, countries such as Pakistan or Iran who have cyber 
capabilities and who have been known to back terrorist organizations as proxy sources 
could proliferate more cyber capabilities to terrorist organizations. As a result, nation-
states could enhance terrorist activity, as a means to put further distance between 
attacking rivals and having an identifiable cyber trail that can be retaliated against. In 
addition, this threat establishes the importance of the foundation of transnational norms 
of cyberspace. However, due to the capability and advantage a cyberspace program 
maintains, it is unlikely that norms will be a byproduct of international cooperation until 
either the technology reaches a plateau and is widely accessible, or incites large-scale 
impacts or conflict that cause citizens to push governments to accountability. 
History of Nuclear Terrorism 
The first instance in which nuclear terrorism was seriously considered was during 
the 1986 incident of the disaster that resulted from an engineering failure in a Soviet 
RBMK reactor, resulting in the infamous Chernobyl incident. Prior to further 
investigation, the Soviets believed at one point that the explosion that caused the incident 
was due to a western, or internal, sabotage operation. This would have represented the 
first case of an attack on a nuclear facility and after the disaster, the damage that a civil 
facility could cause if sabotaged was fully recognized as a threat to security. With the 
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dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991, concerns were raised of loose fissile 
material or nuclear weapons being acquired by extremist or militant groups that were 
otherwise operating in the region freely (Kuperman, 2014). This was the first-time 
nuclear terrorism was held as a legitimate fear by governments and the public of non-
state actors having access to nuclear material or assets, with fear these militant groups 
may want to utilize a nuclear device to bargain for legitimacy. The governments from 
former Soviet states as well as members of NATO collectively secured and maintained 
control over nuclear material in the region in a joint effort many in nuclear security and 
non-proliferation studies to be a great success story (Allison, 2004). This changed 
however in 1995, when a nerve-gas attack on Tokyo’s subways by Aum Shinrikyo, a 
Japanese cult believing in the need for a nuclear apocalypse, killed several civilians and 
injured dozens.  
Aum Shinrikyo had planned to buy a nuclear weapon, and later as this plan failed, 
encountered several barriers to obtaining fissile material. With plans to manufacture their 
own fissile material, they hurriedly scrapped their plans for a nuclear attack due to a 
perception of law enforcement getting close to discovering their operations. 
Psychologically deterred by fear of punishment, instead the group opted to use a home-
grown variant of sarin gas. After the attack, the Japanese and American authorities 
convened, admitting they were not close to raiding Aum Shinrikyo and in fact had only 
had slight run-ins with Japanese police but were never pursued, largely due to its 
protection status as a religious group. Only once the attack had occurred and 
responsibility claimed by the nuclear-zealous cult, did authorities fully learn the extent 
and efforts made to commit a nuclear terrorism attack. This was followed up in the same 
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year with Chechen rebels in Russia openly displaying a desire to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. It is unknown as to whether or not these rebels would use the weapon or use it as 
a bargain for legitimacy. These incidents represent the start of a growing trend of non-
state actors openly displaying their desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda became 
the third primary organization in which a pursuit for acquiring a nuclear device existed 
when Usama bin Laden openly read a recorded statement in 2003 in which he threatened 
to use a nuclear device on western states (Wenger, 2012).   
This was later repeated in the early 2010s again. For a short time the Islamic State 
also sought access to a nuclear device, though this seemed to be less serious as past 
examples in terms of their commitment as well as it was considered highly probable that 
the device would be used to secure legitimacy rather than as an actual weapon for 
achieving their goal of establishing a state or central caliphate (Weiss, 2016). Despite 
this, the threat of radiological attacks persisted. It is unclear, in 2020, if a resurgence in 
the Islamic State movement will occur or if this goal will be reiterated with more evident 
commitment. The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal given the instability of the 
country has been cause for concern. In particular, there is concern that loose nuclear 
weapons or material could fall into the hands of terrorist organizations, or local insurgent 
groups, similar to the situation during the fall of the Soviet Union, albeit on a smaller 
scale (Allison, 2004). Due to the uncooperative nature of North Korea and its presence in 
illicit markets, a genuine fear exists that given the poor internal stability of the state, 
North Korea may openly sell fissile material, or weapons components, to terrorist 
organizations in exchange for more common resources that sanctions have prohibited. 
With the attack on Iranian centrifuges with the Stuxnet worm discovered in 2010, largely 
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attributed to a joint U.S.-Israel program, and with the recent Iranian intent to continue 
nuclear development with the collapse of the Iran Nuclear Deal, the threat of an Iranian 
proxy force gaining access to nuclear material is a serious consideration. In addition, 
particularly in the consideration of state-backed terrorist organizations, the resources 
made available for cyber-attacks on nuclear infrastructure or security systems is of a 
growing concern that ought to be addressed by new policy and existing agencies. In 
particular the threat of an attack on critical targets such as civil nuclear facilities, threats 
against Nuclear Command and Control and Communication (NC3), and the stripping 
back of existing layers of nuclear security measures such as the employment of nuclear 
forensics that may allow for easier access or entry of nuclear material, are the primary 
targets that are at the whims of advances in cyberwarfare employed by non-state actors 
(Bunn, 2016). Due to the lack of technological understanding and speedy development 
that outpaces policy-makers, no serious regulation on technological development has a 
presence in U.S. policy. This gap in U.S. national security policy, particularly as it relates 
to nuclear terrorism, does not take into account new and upcoming threats from the cyber 
realm. It is important that past policy be reviewed, new policy implemented, and the roles 
of policy-makers and implementers reviewed to address these issues in a time-sensitive 
security environment given the proliferation of advancing technology to non-state actors. 
Literature Review 
In order to address how U.S. policy concerning nuclear terrorism has changed as a 
result of an increase in cyberthreats, it is necessary that one understands the chronology 
of literature with respect to the development of information in the fields of nuclear 
security, cybersecurity, and terrorism studies. Literature regarding deterrence theory and 
its relationship with these three topics will all be reviewed, following a chronology of the 
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progression of each wave and related school of thought.  The study of these periods is 
integral for understanding how they can best be combined and applied to addressing the 
development of policy addressing cyber threats posed by terrorist organizations to 
nuclear security. 
Deterrence Theory 
The landscape of literature regarding strategic national security issues most 
consistently invokes the use of deterrence theory, a theory that holds the most consistent 
relevance in all three domains of policy regarding the issues of nuclear security, 
cybersecurity, and terrorism studies. Deterrence theory is a theory by which an actor can 
deter another actor from performing actions deemed harmful, through the threat of 
retaliation or repercussions. Deterrence theory was originally developed as a theoretical 
approach to penology, focused on the psychology of criminals and preventing crime 
(Jervis, 1985). Since its initial inception, however, deterrence theory has evolved into 
providing approaches to larger strategic and military applications, laying out the concept 
that modern military strategy is more so the effective employment of coercion and 
intimidation in order to prevent a larger break out of conflict or violence as opposed to 
the traditional sciences of military victory (Schelling, 1966). In addition, Schelling 
established that nuclear weapons are best used as a deterrent rather than a military 
solution. This larger doctrine, now known as rational deterrence theory, has its roots 
regarding nuclear assets and addressing the future of nuclear policy (Knopf, 2010). 
Taking hold of academia and informing generations of policy-makers, four identifiable 
waves of deterrence theory have come about.  The redefining of deterrence theory took 
several decades and was ultimately the result of the first three waves until reaching its 
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modern contextualization within the fourth wave (Schelling, 1966). What would later 
become known as the first wave of deterrence theory began in 1945.  
The first wave is a direct response to the development of nuclear weapons and 
their impacts on military strategy. Reevaluating the practice of warfare, particularly of an 
inter-state variety, given the rise of nuclear devices was the paramount focus of this first 
wave (Brodie, 1946; Morgenstern, 1959). First wave academics believed that they needed 
to develop criteria for when nuclear weapons ought to be utilized and when their 
devastation should be considered militarily. This shifted to the potential of using public 
knowledge of capability and using nuclear weapons as a threat to coerce other states not 
to enter rivalry. The majority of this theoretical approach was focused on the 
psychological impact that a nuclear device can have on a potential adversary, given the 
public knowledge of the destruction caused by such a device. It was believed that the 
scale of destruction and public understanding would deter adversaries from attacking or 
becoming hostile with the United States. This first wave of early academics, such as 
Brodie and Morgenstern, among a variety of other early theorists most notably laid the 
groundwork for considerations and the future of deterrence theory. Despite this, a limited 
impact on the practice of policymakers and international relations would cause deterrence 
not to be approached for several years (Wenger, 2012). 
Given the recognition of the preemptive attempts at solutions made in the first 
wave, the second wave occurred in 1947 when the former Soviet Union became the first 
nuclear rival, kicking off the second wave of deterrence theory with a more centralized 
focus among policymakers and preceding academia, the total aversion of nuclear conflict 
(Wenger, 2012). The failures of the first wave of deterrence to address proliferation of 
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nuclear weapons and a lack of use in practice led to a more practically driven approach to 
deterrence, acknowledging that the aversion of conflict was paramount to the survival of 
the United States. The second wave consisted of a reaction to the great shifts in 
international relations given the beginning of the Cold War, the focus being on managing 
nuclear rivalry. It is in this wave that the majority of modern principles of deterrence 
theory begin to appear. This new wave of deterrence theory quickly evolved to deal with 
managing nuclear rivalry via the implementation of game theory methodologies (Wenger, 
2012). This second wave of deterrence theory is most notable for its heavy dependence 
on rational choice theory and use of modeling.  Prerequisites were established for 
successful implementation of deterrence in policy: commitment, communication, 
capability, credibility, and resolve (Kaufmann, 1956). Each of these pillars were 
expanded on by varying academics to form the foundational roots by which further 
progressions in deterrence literature would be guided by. Deterrence theory expanded 
rapidly to include multiple interpretations and classifications. 
The second wave is a highlight in the development of deterrence theory through 
the nuance granted with expansion. Particular applications of practicing deterrence theory 
were further subcategorized, leading to more specific and varied branches of deterrence 
theory in academia. The first of these variations is immediate deterrence, where a rival 
thinks of attacking another actor and the actor responds with a retaliating threat (Morgan, 
2003). This is differentiated from the use of general deterrence, where rivals use 
coercion, often through policy or politics, to regulate threats in a much broader manner 
(Morgan, 2003). Direct deterrence is the protection of one’s own country from a hostile 
(Kahn, 1960). Extended deterrence is the focus of protecting attacks against nation-states 
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in which a country has formed an alliance (Russett, 1963). Lastly, there were two 
variations in targeting methods when applying deterrence theory, countervalue targeting 
being focused on threatening economic, social, or political assets whereas counterforce 
targeting were threats against military infrastructure and capabilities (Huth, 1990). Given 
a rise in use and shifts in interpretation, deterrence was reinforced as a method of making 
a threat not commit an action, while “compellence” is making a hostile perform a desired 
action they would not have otherwise (Schelling, 1966). Deterrence by means of 
punishment, a method of employing threats of action to manipulate behavior became a 
subdivision of deterrence by denial, a method in which the utility calculus of an 
adversary is manipulated to lower the perception of benefits a hostile may identify if 
committing a particular action (Snyder, 1961; Mearsheimer, 1983). These are two 
distinctions of impacting the utilitarian psychology of a potential hostile through different 
methods of adding a cost to committing an act or subtracting a perceived benefit. The 
largely theoretical approach to deterrence theory in this second wave netted results 
primarily centered on the bipolar state of international affairs given the rivalry between 
the United States and the former Soviet Union. The goals and assumptions of the second 
wave were based on maintaining the then status quo of nuclear rivalry, assuming that 
actors were rational and unitary, a byproduct of its limited application only in the domain 
of international relations. 
Although deterrence theory persisted as a doctrine of nuclear rivalry dealing with 
nation-states, a third wave of deterrence theory originated during the early 1970s, with 
the introduction of quantitative and qualitative methods. This empirically driven wave 
sought to test the theoretical frameworks established within the preceding wave, 
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including the models, perceived connections, and foundations (Russett, 1963; Morgan, 
2003; George, 1974; Snyder, 1961). 
Through the qualitative and quantitative testing of deterrence theory, 
understanding an actor’s individual motive was identified as an important part of the new 
line of deterrence research. The analysis of deterrence either failing or succeeding 
appeared to be tied to an actor’s commitment to an action as well as the cost-analysis by 
the actor of accepting a threat (Huth, 1984; Salmon, 1976). The third wave began a shift 
of looking at individuals and delved deeper into the root theories behind the development 
of deterrence including utilitarianism and rational choice theory. It is here that the 
concepts of individual actors obtaining nuclear capability is first considered in academia. 
Given the context of individual actors, the third wave emphasized that an individual actor 
must be analyzed alongside their objectives and what risks are associated with obtaining 
the individual’s objectives. In this wave, applying utility calculus as well as incorporating 
human psychology, culture, perceived reactions, fatigue, and how human limitations 
could impact decision-making were addressed as key functions to understanding how to 
successfully apply deterrence (Steinbruner, 1976; Jervis, 2003; Harvey, 1998; Walt, 
1999; Berejikian, 2002). The inclusion of rewards alongside established threats was 
reintroduced into deterrence theory from its early penology roots (Huth). It was made 
concretely clear through quantitative and qualitative evidence that even if utility calculus 
was applied, utility could be measured and perceived differently by different actors, 
including those who are deemed rational (Lebow, 1989).  
Through the qualitative and quantitative analysis done on the work in the 
preceding wave, it was determined that the value of positive rewards had been 
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overlooked by second wave theorists (Russett, 1963). In addition, the assessment of costs 
from the adversary’s perspective could lead to the failings of deterrence theory, as 
rational becomes subjective, causing breakdowns in previous rational choice approaches 
to deterrence (Jervis, 1985). Ultimately, this third wave of deterrence, particularly driven 
by the likes of Jervis, Russett, Lebow, and Stein, produced a more well-defined 
subcategorization of deterrence theory in practice, focusing on addressing the limitations, 
interpretations, and assumptions made within the second wave. This qualitative and 
quantitative-driven period of research would help inform policy-makers and future 
academics on how to put deterrence into policy and practice, given supportive data for 
the criteria of success and failure, while introducing the importance of social behavior 
and individual actors. 
The fourth wave of deterrence is considered to be the modern-day application of 
deterrence theory (Knopf, 2008). Starting after the fall of the USSR and applying the 
previous methods and understandings made in the third wave, the fourth wave of 
deterrence is focused on the rise of more asymmetrical threats such as rogue states, 
cyberwarfare, and terrorist organizations (Smith, 2006; Wyn, 2004; Harknett, 2010; 
Jervis, 2003; Lebovic, 2007; Libicki, 2009). Due to the relatively rapid growth in non-
state actor threats, this fourth wave of deterrence research is in a similar position as the 
second wave, in which academics have a variety of theoretical approaches, however do 
not yet possess the empirical evidence to support, properly test, and implement theory 
into practice (Davis, 2002; Crenshaw, 2003; Wyn, 2004; Wilner, 2011). This fourth wave 
represents the most current academic deterrence research. 
4th Wave Deterrence in Nuclear Terrorism & Cybersecurity 
20 
 
 Because the 4th wave of deterrence includes a broader set of actors than previous 
waves, the primary focus of literature as it relates to this thesis is literature regarding 
nuclear terrorism, cybersecurity, and general literature regarding non-state actors, in 
particularly in response to terrorist organizations. Literature on the topic of Nuclear 
Terrorism or WMD Terrorism is a niche field in which not many academics were 
previously involved in during the earlier waves of deterrence applications. The 
introduction of terrorism to nuclear security can be seen in the empirical and evaluation 
qualities of the third wave of deterrence theory, with non-state actors being addressed in 
theory sparingly in preceding waves (George, 1974). Graham Allison, a seminal figure in 
nuclear terrorism academia, led the further development of literature on nuclear terrorism 
through his comprehensive research in which he details historical context to how non-
actors have sought to control nuclear assets in the past and how they may do so in the 
future (Allison, 2004). Addressing the topic of Nuclear Terrorism, Allison illustrates the 
reality of a possible nuclear attack by a terrorist organization and how to prevent it from 
occurring. Brian Michael Jenkins, is a leading figure on understanding the utility and risk 
calculations a terrorist organization may interpret when considering the obtainment of a 
nuclear device and in understanding how these organizations value these devices (Davis, 
2002). This work in understanding the psychology behind actors pursuing nuclear 
terrorism and the goal of its prevention is primarily premised on the concepts of 
deterrence. Martha Crenshaw is another leading figure in the literature on nuclear 
terrorism, addressing U.S. policy and strategy in deterring al Qaeda from pursing the use 
of nuclear weapons. She describes the objective of current U.S. policy being the use of 
deterrence through applying the pressure of retaliatory threats (Crenshaw, 2017). 
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Through evaluating the Bush and Obama administrations use of strategic deterrence 
applied to terrorist organizations, policy does not yet fully integrate deterrence theory in 
addressing a way to effectively achieve nuclear deterrence with terrorist organizations, 
despite successes in writing policy, the practice and implementation has several failings 
(Crenshaw, 2017). Overall, literature on nuclear terrorism is largely derived from theory 
surrounding the cases of non-state actors who actively sought or pursued interest in 
accessing nuclear material or assets. This has led to the expansion of a fields involved in 
addressing nuclear terrorism, with attempts at producing practical responses for a variety 
of fields including medicine and sciences, given the potential for a future attack 
(Auerswald, 2006; Knopf, 2010; Dunn, 2008). This has widened the literature in nuclear 
forensics, believing to act as yet another deterrent to proliferation or movement of nuclear 
material by terrorist organizations (Knopf, 2008). Despite dealing with terrorist groups as 
actors and rogue states as suppliers, the increase in rogue states has led to a higher 
probability of state-backed terror groups, who would have more support than traditional 
terrorist groups (Knopf, 2010). 
When applying deterrence to the realm of cyberspace, academia is clearly within 
the confines of the fourth wave of deterrence theory development, however appears as 
though it were the first or second wave. The rise in technological reliance and capabilities 
in conjunction with the rise in cyber threats and state-sponsored cyberwarfare have 
brought academics to rush into creating new theoretical approaches at dealing with the 
rise in virtual threats. In terms of deterrence theory’s applications to cyberspace in 
academia, they are twofold. One, because of the successes in other realms of security 
issues and its various methodologies of employment, deterrence theory is best suited to 
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deal with the issues presented by cyber threats as the principles of utility calculus and 
non-state actors in the fourth wave clearly show that cyberspace is another asymmetric 
threat (Heitzenrater, 2015). In addition, the fast pace of technological development 
doesn’t leave much room for the adoption of entirely new methods of approaching 
security policy without leaving a further compromised position in cyberspace. This can 
be remedied via the further development of cyber-deterrence theory (Kramer, 2013; 
Dogrul, 2011). Secondly, deterrence theory in the fourth wave suffers in many of the 
same ways as the second wave in that there is a lack of empirical evidence that 
employing deterrence is effective or worthwhile (Taddeo, 2018). In addition, the 
underlying assumptions that deterrence in cybersecurity issues would work in the same 
way as when applied to terrorism studies is in question (Harknett, 2010). In addition, the 
study of cyber-deterrence suffers from a lack of an effective game model as in classical 
deterrence theory approaches due to the non-existence of clear preceding rules and 
regulations in cyberspace as there had been during the second wave of deterrence as 
applied to nuclear weapons (Bendiek, 2015; Stevens, 2012). Despite this, the cyber 
domain is internationally recognized as the next frontier of conflict (Osawa, 2017).  
Skepticism in Deterrence Studies 
Although deterrence theory and its waves are the dominant school of thought 
given the three topics of nuclear security, cybersecurity, and terrorism in terms of applied 
theories, another category of academic literature exists. This is skepticism, a self-analytic 
approach in which literature is reviewed and critiqued given changes in academia, data 
collection, and shifts in agency policies. Skepticism functions largely as the nuclear-
specific equivalent of the self-criticism school of thought available in the broader scope 
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of terrorism studies and serves in the same manner for cybersecurity academia. This 
method often looks at establishing assumptions made within larger theories, dissecting 
whether these assumptions are true or effective given new data or academic revelations. 
The rise of the third wave of deterrence theory, bringing its psychological roots and 
further data collection, is largely responsible for the increase in skeptic scholars, in which 
classic assumptions and premises for the successful use of deterrence theory have fallen 
under scrutiny. Among this scrutiny have been calls for changes in how deterrence theory 
ought to operate and inform policy-makers in the future, questions whether deterrence 
theory is still relevant, and what limitations it possesses. A contention with deterrence 
theory that skeptic scholars have focused on in recent years is the case of acquisition-use 
theory. Acquisition-use theory is a theory that takes into account the premises of 
deterrence theory in terms of employing utilitarian calculus and rational choice theory in 
order to come to the conclusion if a terrorist organization would or would not use a 
nuclear device if one was obtained (Bell, 2019). The application of game model theories 
that have previously been employed in past nuclear literature are a particular target of 
skeptic review, given that perceived conclusions of data as well as the implications for 
the interpretations of what the data collected means, fall under scrutiny here such as in 
the case of threat analysis inflation. (Lewis, 2002; Colbourn, 2015). This inflation would 
drastically alter the presented likelihood of an event, particularly in regards to attacks, 
with such subjectivity that the data presented to policy-makers has been deemed 
unreliable in later review. In this way, skepticism is used to help understand how 
interpretations of the work in deterrence theory literature can vary, and how this variation 
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can drastically alter the policy and policy-makers work in deterrence theory seeks to 
inform.  
Policy-Makers: Congress & Federal Bureaucracy 
In attempting to understand how U.S. policy regarding nuclear terrorism has 
changed as a result of an increase in cyber threats, it is important to understand the 
policy-makers that will ultimately be responsible for putting theory into practice. The 
most relevant U.S. policy can be split into two categories: Congressional and 
Bureaucratic. Congressional policy and Presidential statements on nuclear terrorism as 
well as bureaucratic agency reports and reviews have been the primary employers of 
deterrence theory in policy. However, the historical practice of these policies has not 
netted the desired results initially sought in writing (Crenshaw, 2017). As a result, the 
implementation of policy has been increasingly deferred among agencies to others with 
specific knowledge or capabilities, such as intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and 
defense institutions, who are better equipped to carry out specific tasks needed for the 
enforcement of policies. This diffusion of responsibility is not intentional in policy, 
however could occur due to a potential lack of understanding and capability of different 
agencies by policymakers when deciding on agencies best fit to implement policy. In 
addition, a selected agency could seek out additional support from another with more 
assets or intelligence on accomplishing a specific policy goal so repeatedly that a de facto 
state of responsibility exists but is by no way guaranteed. Despite this, congressional 
policy has slowly started making the shift of addressing policy, along with the division of 
responsibilities among bureaucratic agencies, focusing on non-state actors as it applies to 
nuclear security and applying deterrence theory (Pandza, 2011).  
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The internal policies produced by bureaucratic agencies, or the additions built on 
by congressional guidelines are more detailed and accurate to modern trends; however, 
the various realms in which each of the federal agencies operate and have jurisdiction has 
created conflict in the execution of policy.  In addition, inter-agency cooperation has 
continued to be an issue that hampers the development of further cyber-deterrence policy 
in regards to nuclear terrorism (Harknett, 2010). This inter-agency conflict was addressed 
by the Obama Administration in a review of Homeland Security policy. As these 
agencies have the most accurate information and understanding of both nuclear and cyber 
assets, it is recognized by some academics that some of the successful implementations of 
deterrence theory found in past agency policy can be applied in the future (Nye, 2011). 
Bureaucratic agencies are also considered to be more effective and influential due to their 
overall better prioritization on security issues compared to that of Congress (Nye, 2013). 
In addition, these agencies have particular expertise associated with their particular 
mission set that are necessary when addressing highly technical or complex security 
issues, something that Congress lacks. The increasing reliance on bureaucratic agencies 
has also introduced more proactive deterrence theory tactics into execution, giving 
agencies a method of working more proactively at implementation than congressional 
policy addresses (Oti, 2015). 
 Given the current landscape of literature and academia, the issue this thesis seeks 
to address is a representation of combined features of the fields of nuclear security, 
cybersecurity, and terrorism studies through the context of the policy-making process. 
Each of these fields of study have their own varying uses of deterrence theory, this thesis 
is uniquely incorporating all three, whereas these issue areas would be addressed in pairs, 
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or singularly, in the status quo of academia. This led to two primary research questions 
being developed. How has U.S. policy regarding nuclear terrorism changed as a result of 
an increase in cyber threats? What federal agency is most capable of dealing with 
cyberthreats concerning nuclear terrorism? In answering this first question, understanding 
the development of deterrence theory as applied to all three issue areas collectively, this 
paper seeks to argue that as deterrence theory has evolved, so too has nuclear security 
policy. This change will inform the content of the policy as well as provide guidelines for 
bureaucratic agencies, leading to the second question. Given superior intelligence 
resources and ability to respond to threats more directly, this paper argues that 
intelligence agencies are in the best position to deal with cyberthreats concerning nuclear 
terrorism. 
 The pursual of these research questions fills a significant gap in nuclear terrorism 
literature. In existing nuclear terrorism academia, cyberthreats are most often given the 
context of traditional deterrence theory between rival states as opposed to non-state 
actors. In existing cybersecurity literature, the vulnerabilities of nuclear systems represent 
a niche of literature, similarly contributing to inter-state conflict rather than terrorist 
organizations or individual actors. In terms of terrorism studies, literature exists on both 
cybersecurity and nuclear issues, however end in pairings. This contribution to the 
academic field of political science is unique in its focus on all three issue areas 
collectively. The results of this study contribute to the fourth wave of deterrence theory in 
assessing how asymmetric threats inform deterrence theory and in turn impact decisions 
for policy-makers and ensuing policy. Lastly, this study provides more empirical 
evidence, informing the disconnect between policy and application, identifying which 
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federal actors are in the best position to extend deterrence theory successfully into the 
future, perhaps into a fifth wave. 
Theoretical Framework 
The primary theoretical framework for the study of this paper is deterrence 
theory. Deterrence theory is the dominant theoretical approach that informs policy-
makers and leadership in a variety of issue areas including nuclear security, 
cybersecurity, terrorism studies, and military strategy. The theory derives from a 
psychological theory of the same name, commonly applied to the study of penology and 
criminal law. In its psychology and criminal basis, the theory is used in two parts in order 
to achieve a desired outcome. First, the threat of punishment will dissuade or deter an 
individual from committing a crime again. Secondly, the public knowledge of this 
punishment is psychologically stressing enough to deter individuals from committing the 
crime in the first place. Its application then shifted to addressing the future of military 
strategy and the development of nuclear weapons (Schelling, 1966). Although deterrence 
has gone through a variety of changes in its four waves of application, primarily to 
nuclear issues, this study applies the use of fourth wave deterrence theory to examine 
how U.S. policy regarding nuclear terrorism has changed with an increase in cyber 
threats.  
Fourth-wave deterrence theory in particular looks at the application of deterrence 
to asymmetric threats. This includes non-state actors, individuals, terrorist organizations, 
rogue states, and upcoming threats (Smith, 2006). This fits primarily with the first 
research question. How has U.S. policy concerning nuclear terrorism changed with an 
increase in cyber threats? This question incorporates the asymmetry of terrorist 
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organizations and cyberspace with the modernization of the theory in regards to nuclear 
security. 
Deterrence theory incorporates several other theoretical approaches as the basis 
for its operation. Included in this is rational choice theory, an 18th century theory 
developed by Cesare Beccaria. The premise of rational choice theory lies in that the 
social collective is made up of individuals, with each individual being able to make 
choices and preferences when given a variety of options. The individual will take into 
account public information and understandings about the world around them, informing 
their desired choice given a situation in which their decision is a variable. This 
calculation may be done over time regarding large decisions, however could often be 
used to understand why individuals perform seemingly mundane tasks a particular way. 
The driver behind this could be described as utility. 
This leads into yet another foundation of deterrence theory in the form of 
Utilitarianism. Developed into literature by Jeremy Bentham, but not necessarily its first 
instance of understanding, utilitarianism can be described as a method in which an 
individual will attempt to maximize their own utility, with utility being subject to 
variation but generally related to the prospect of increasing pleasures, advantages, 
happiness, and other positive interpretations of an individual gaining something. In 
addition, it references the prospect of utility excluding negative connotations. This core 
principle of utility can be used broadly or redefined to specific issue areas, in this case 
security, safety, and continual existence are recurring interpretations in literature on 
nuclear terrorism. This inherently is a core principle in rational-choice theory as it is 
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applied to deterrence and in game modeling, often acquainted with early phases of 
deterrence. 
Data Collection/Methodology 
 
 To answer the research question of how has U.S. policy concerning nuclear 
terrorism changed as a result of an increase in cyber threats, content analysis of 
documents pertaining to nuclear security, terrorism, and cybersecurity was analyzed. 
Given that the text of documents is being analyzed and the research questions asked by 
this thesis, content analysis was the best methodology to use. Content analysis is a 
methodology defined as making objective inferences and identifying, systematically, 
particular characteristics in a text (Holsti, 1969). The eighteen texts studied for this 
project span from 1957 to late 2018 and include: thirteen Congressional hearings from 
both the House and Senate, more specifically from the Committee on Homeland Security, 
Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, and the Committee of Governmental Affairs; a review conducted by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in February of 2013, a presidential advisory 
committee report from late 1957, and three national strategy statements by two White 
House administrations from 2003 and 2018.  
Using content analysis, these documents were coded for a variety of elements 
(See Appendix A). Along with basic identifying information regarding the context of the 
document such as the title, year produced, agency, subcommittee; each document was 
coded for the asset, infrastructure, or system of concern that is under threat and being 
addressed, as well as the non-state actor being perceived as threatening. Following this, 
the type of cyber threat was coded for, if one is addressed. Each of these types of threats 
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were quantified with regards to how many times they are mentioned. The content and 
context of addressing the cyber threat were recorded. Several other factors were coded for 
pertaining to each document, with a yes or no answer. These other factors include: 
whether or not the document addresses future or upcoming threats, whether or not the 
document provides guidelines to bureaucratic agencies on enforcement or 
implementation, and whether or not the document references previous policies, noting if 
the referenced policy was perceived as negative or positive with the unit of analysis being 
individual words, sentences, and paragraphs. In addition, the documents were also coded 
for the specific method for employing deterrence, what the intended target is for being 
deterred, be it individuals, groups, assets, and others; whether or not the deterrence used 
is limited to direct deterrence, as it is dealing solely with the United States (Kahn), or 
extended, dealing with allies. Being the sole coder for this study, there is no intercoder 
reliability. 
 In answering the second research question of what federal agency is most capable 
of dealing with cyber threats concerning nuclear security, several additional factors were 
coded for. Again, content analysis was used to quantify and log how many times a 
particular federal agency was mentioned explicitly or implicitly, as well as particular 
departments that may be part of a larger agency. Through this coding process, the 
research shows what agencies are critical to filling the gap in providing an effective 
defense against nuclear terrorism in the age of 21st century cybersecurity. 
Findings/Analysis 
 The use of deterrence theory by policy-makers to inform policy and decision-
making within federal agencies in addressing nuclear terrorism as well as cyberthreats 
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has been consistent. Although the use of 4th wave deterrence theory is inherent in 
addressing these asymmetrical threats, it is clear from an analysis of the documents 
examined for this thesis that policy-makers have not abandoned the second wave of Cold 
War-era deterrence theory. Second wave deterrence is mostly applied to international 
relations, when one is dealing with states and rational opponents, rather than rogue states, 
terrorist organizations, or asymmetric threats that dominate the fourth wave of deterrence 
theory. Second wave deterrence is a critical component for addressing cyberthreats as 
nation-states have yet to organize or create rules amongst themselves.  
 The use of second wave deterrence theory in conjunction with fourth wave 
deterrence theory to address cyberthreats also represents how cyberthreats have 
reintroduced concern at the nation-state level in security regarding nuclear terrorism, 
requiring international cooperation. In addition, this shows that asymmetric threats can 
also function as traditional second wave rivals, with the capacity to counter or perform 
attacks with similar efficiency. This counter the points raised by authors like Harknett 
and Taddeo, who call into question the use of deterrence theory in cybersecurity. 
Although their concerns are mainly derived from a lack of empirical evidence, the 
capability that the use of cyber threats offers terrorist organizations creates a more 
balanced, yet asymmetric security environment with other nations. This showcases a 
clear need to incorporate second wave deterrence theory alongside fourth wave 
deterrence theory as the asymmetric threat has developed to a level that it could be used 
to undermine the advantages held by recognized states, allowing for terrorist 
organizations to utilize cyber capabilities as a means to enter a rivalry that is protected by 
their lack of geographic restriction and abilities to operate without rules.  
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The previous gaps in the security of nuclear-related assets that have been filled 
have been reopened with the introduction of more complex cyberthreats, including 
various methods of circumventing nuclear forensic technology used to detect, track, and 
create a barrier for movement of fissile material, required to use or produce a nuclear 
device. In addition, the use of artificial intelligence paired with traditional worm-based 
cyber-attacks have clear implications for the laboratories, civilian power system, and 
potentially portions of the traditional nuclear triad. This concern has increased since the 
public acknowledgment of the Stuxnet worm in 2010, with the potential for more 
advanced artificial intelligence to make future worms more destructive, a threat noted in 
the 2018 National Cyber Strategy. “The United States Government will examine the use 
of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, while 
addressing risks inherent in their use and application” (United States, 2018, 15). The 
upcoming development of quantum computing has implications internationally as well, 
creating a situation in which previous encryption and security systems utilized by any 
government could be compromised. This vulnerability is addressed in the 2018 National 
Cyber Strategy of the United States of America, stating “To protect against the potential 
threat of quantum computers being able to break modern public key cryptography, the 
Department of Commerce, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), will continue to solicit, evaluate, and standardize quantum-resistant, public key 
cryptographic algorithms” (United States, 2018, 8). In terms of an effect on nuclear 
terrorism, this technology could circumvent the protections used to protect the traditional 
nuclear triad, previously protected via its lack of connectivity, but potentially leaving 
NC3 capabilities vulnerable as technological progress creates new avenues for opposition 
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forces to perform attacks. In the 2018 National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism, the introduction of new or novel threats, including those of a 
cyber nature is of clear concern, stating “The brief span between the discovery of the 
neutron in 1932 and the use of nuclear weapons in 1945 illustrates the stunning pace with 
which unexpected threats can materialize. Yet, future WMD threats might arise not only 
from exotic new capabilities but also from reduced barriers to extant technology. Others 
may stem from novel combinations of technologies to produce unforeseen effects, a 
phenomenon foreshadowed by our adversaries’ increasingly creative coupling of cyber-
attacks with disinformation campaigns” (United States, 2018, 12). 
Through these findings, although there has been a significant move forward to 
using fourth wave deterrence theory by policy-makers, in synchronization with academia 
post 2001, second wave deterrence has become increasingly used as the complexity and 
capability of cyberthreats grow (See Figure C).  Independently, one could come to the 
conclusion that if separated from the context of nuclear terrorism, cybersecurity and 
addressing cyber threats alone seems to follow a similar development cycle in terms of 
deterrence theory as nuclear security had during its inception in the late 1940s. There 
seemed to be a significant trend in the movement to second wave deterrence in 
conjunction with the consistency of the fourth wave deterrence theory as the complexity 
of a threat grew, or, in other words, as the type of cyber threat had potential to affect 
multiple nations, establishing cooperative relationships with other nations became a 
priority. Now nation-states like the United States must look at other nations as rivals as 
well as non-state actors and rogue nations as more serious threats than previous, capable 
of rival methods of engagement. This is again represented in deterrence theory with the 
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most common use being direct deterrence followed by extended deterrence, showing that 
the focus of the application of deterrence theory among policy-makers is on protecting 
the U.S. via its own resources, placing cooperation with allies as a secondary priority 
(See Figure D). This focus is acting in contradiction to Osawa’s claims of understanding 
that cyberspace is the next critical area of operations when it comes to emerging conflict, 
perhaps showing the reactive nature to policy-makers. In this case, Crenshaw’s concerns 
of implementation could be reinforced due to a lack of up-to-date understanding of 
cyberthreats held by policy-makers. 
In terms of addressing cyberthreats, legislators are clearly reactionary rather than 
proactive. Following an increase in cyberthreats and the complexity of which is growing, 
demonstrated by the deployment of Stuxnet in 2010, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act was implemented in 2013. At the time, 2013 and 2014 represented the 
largest consideration for cyberthreats being addressed by legislators, fifty-five and fifty-
two times respectively. This reaction would repeat, with a variety of 2015 hearings 
producing a previous average of around fifteen times cyberthreats were addressed per 
document. Following cyberattacks on U.S. election systems in 2016, cyberthreats were 
addressed ninety-one times, representing a new high, shortly before continuing the 
previous trend of only being addressed an average of fifteen or so times by legislators per 
hearing or report. In addition, of these documents, 61.1% addressed future or upcoming 
threats to security. However, only 33.3% provided guidelines for implementing policy or 
providing a division of responsibility among agencies, only seeming to do so several 
years after a peak in concern.  
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This was reflected in the earliest form of national strategy with the 2003 National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, that provided a list of initiatives and major goals, but did 
not provide guidelines, delegate responsibility, or provide resources for how to achieve 
them. This critique of the 2003 strategy was present in a 2013 GAO report, that stated 
“The lack of milestones and performance measures at the strategic level is mirrored in 
similar shortcomings within key government programs that are part of the government-
wide strategy. For example, the DHS inspector general reported in 2011 that the DHS 
Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) office had not yet developed objective, 
quantifiable performance measures to determine whether it was meeting its mission to 
secure cyberspace and protect critical infrastructures” (Government Accountability 
Office, 2013, pp. 31). This is a concerning trend given that the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has had the largest growing trend of all other federal agencies since 2003 
(See Figure C) with regard to cybersecurity when concerning nuclear terrorism. 
In terms of the development of policy, there seems to be a significant amount of 
review of past policy, with 83.3% of documents reflecting on or referring to past policy. 
Of this discussion, 33.3% of past policy was seen as positive, 27.8% as negative, 22.2% 
as discussing past policy both positively and negatively, leaving only three of eighteen 
documents that neglected to reference previous policy. This shows that along with being 
reactive in nature, legislators are also attempting to understand how policy has been 
implemented after previous discussion, showing a disconnect between policy-makers and 
the implementation of policy as well as a lack of technical knowledge necessary in 
addressing the issues related to cyberspace and nuclear terrorism. This reactivity over 
proactivity was identified as early as 2005 by the House of Representatives, which stated 
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“Better intelligence can be seen as a dynamic component of nuclear defense, 
complementing the essentially reactive and stationary risk management systems that the 
United States is implementing” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005, 8). 
It is clear that cyberthreats have the ability to reopen vectors for attacks that were 
previously thought to be secure. For example, “Since 2009, after President Obama’s 
administration, DNDO (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office) has made important changes 
and made especially good progress in nuclear forensics” (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2014, 4). Along with upcoming or experimental threats, the cybersecurity of nuclear 
forensics systems was a cause for concern over modern nuclear security, a trend 
following this 2014 statement. This shows that security must be continually developed as 
new threats emerge. In regards to addressing nuclear forensics, it was made clear that the 
least likely method for a direct attack would be on NC3 systems or nuclear triad assets as 
the physical installations are well protected and in cyberspace are either disconnected in 
such a way that an insider threat is mandatory or are protected by the technological 
barrier to entry in regards to the development of complex and expensive computing 
capabilities. Instead, nuclear forensics are of great concern as it would help track and 
deter terrorist organizations from moving nuclear material and ultimately alert authorities 
toward a potential development or deployment of a nuclear device. The primary threat 
that this technology safeguards against is from rogue states, criminal groups, or other 
terrorist organizations providing nuclear material or smuggling capabilities to an 
extremist group. This connects to the bulk of literature coming from the foundations of 
the 4th wave of deterrence theory. 
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This acts as the primary effort for deterrence as there is no shortage of fissile 
material to be used for a nuclear device or “dirty-bomb.” For example, the U.S. The 
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on the 
Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack stated “Also we cannot rule out the 
possibility that terrorist organizations may attempt to construct nuclear weapons. 
Although assembly may be a far more difficult path than theft, considerable dual-use 
technology continues to become accessible. And whether nuclear power generation 
expands or contracts in the years ahead, a huge overhang of weapons-usable material will 
remain as a potential source of nuclear weapons” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005, 
5). By deterring access to nuclear material through detection systems, an attack could be 
dissuaded. However, cyberthreats on these systems could eliminate or hamper this 
measure of defense.  
Overall, the trends for policy-makers show growing concern for upcoming threats, 
particularly those that eliminate detection and tracking capabilities, necessary for 
providing important intelligence to authorities on developments of a terrorist 
organization's movement of nuclear material or a device. A concern that is supported by 
Knopf. This can be seen as the agencies responsible for these defensive capabilities are 
increasingly mentioned by policy-makers (See Figure C). In addition, policy-makers 
share a growing concern for strategic level cyberthreats that could be employed by 
nations states and more particularly rogue states that may use an extremist organization 
as a proxy, providing cyber capability to achieve any measure of military, intelligence, or 
political advantage over the United States. Because of the relatively new technology that 
cyberthreats encompass, the use of fourth wave deterrence theory in nuclear terrorism 
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scenarios by policy-makers continues to show dominance. However, there is a resurgence 
in second wave deterrence theory as cybersecurity becomes a growing concern (See 
Figure B). As a result, deterrence theory continues to have important strategic 
implications for both the realms of nuclear security as well as cybersecurity when dealing 
with non-state actors, particularly terrorist organizations. Despite calls for the 
abandonment of deterrence as a theory of practice (Lebow, 1990; Lewis, 2002; Harknett, 
2010; Iasiello, 2014; Colbourn, 2015) to inform modern strategy, particularly in regards 
to the cyber realm, it clearly retains a prominent stance in informing the national strategy 
of the United States as well as policy-makers. Rather, the introduction and progression of 
cyber developments could have the potential to support previous assertions of deterrence 
theory, with potential for further development of 3rd wave deterrence and the 
introduction of a potential fifth wave, dealing with more modern asymmetrical threats. 
This is important because third wave deterrence theory will have entirely different 
critiques regarding cyberthreats than it did with nuclear threats, as the nature of the threat 
and accompanying policy have key differences. The progression of technology could 
show that the 4th wave of deterrence is too broad to address cyberspace and future 
developments within the same category of rogue states and terrorism as it currently does, 
this could result in the need for a more focused category of deterrence focused on 
automated threats that lack the influence factors found in heads of state, individuals, and 
more traditional factors. As a result of the introduction of new technologies and the 
advent of cyber threats, policy regarding nuclear security has shifted to an increased use 
of second wave deterrence theory alongside the long-standing status quo of post-9/11 use 
of fourth wave deterrence theory. As the understanding of cyberthreats continues to grow, 
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one could expect deterrence theory applied to cybersecurity to independently follow a 
similar direction of the four waves of nuclear deterrence. The increasing use of second 
wave deterrence theory show that policy-makers are still primarily focused on controlling 
rational actors and that the asymmetric nature of these threats cannot be solved without 
transnational norms and cooperation to establish a baseline on which to defend against 
threats that are inherent within the fourth wave of deterrence theory. 
In addressing which federal agency is best able to deal with cyberthreats to 
nuclear terrorism, the findings of this study indicate that while DHS continues to have a 
growing amount of relevancy, particularly with its variety of offices focused on the 
detection and security of nuclear material and assets through its direct deterrence 
measures, DHS is becoming increasingly dependent on the findings and information 
provided by intelligence agencies (CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI). Although DHS and a variety of 
law enforcement agencies are particularly well suited to dealing with the prosecution and 
operations side of targeting nuclear terrorism activity, intelligence is necessary to make 
these operations effective as well as become more preventative than reactionary. The 
House of Representatives recognized this in 2005 when it stated “Not enough is known 
about adversaries’ WMD procurement networks in nuclear supplier states: how they are 
organized, and financed, what front companies and other intermediaries are used, who 
their inside collaborators are and so on” (House of Representatives, 2005, 8). This shows 
that the roles of intelligence agencies in their information gathering skills as well as their 
technical expertise in dealing with cyber threats are an important asset that must be 
utilized further to effectively address upcoming threats. This was reported to the United 
States Senate in 2008 with the statement that “the IC (Intelligence Community) provides 
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information critical to our technology development and requirements roadmaps. 
Additionally, our Nonproliferation R&D program managers and our laboratory 
researchers hold appropriate security clearances and are well-informed of threat analyses 
from the IC. We use the results of the threat analysis to guide and steer our investments in 
R&D to ultimately develop sensors to meet the present and future nonproliferation threat” 
(United States Senate, 2008, 51). The lack of intelligence-sharing capabilities revealed 
significant gaps in defense systems, the Senate addressing these gaps in 2008 stating 
“Some steps taken to close these gaps include the development of the Situational 
Awareness CWMD Information Portal and the Interagency CWMD Database of 
Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities to increase coordination” (United States 
Senate, 2008, 50). Inter-agency cooperation has severely limited the response to cyber-
related issues as addressed by the GAO in 2013. “Most of the strategies lacked clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities for key agencies, such as DHS, DOD (Department of 
Defense), and OMB (Office of Management and Budget), that contribute substantially to 
the nation’s cybersecurity programs” (Government Accountability Office, 2013, 33). This 
shows that the issue of inter-agency cooperation is an issue that both nuclear terrorism 
defense as well as cyber defense have in common.  
In 2015, the Obama Administration made an important statement in the White 
House National Security Strategy of 2015 addressing the lack of cooperation among 
agencies dealing with these issues. This called for a clearer division of roles and 
responsibilities. However, this did not influence the majority of the intelligence 
community in regards to a major shift in cooperation, rather only a natural increase in 
relevance among other departments as intelligence and expertise on new threats became 
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apparent to legislators as a high demand factor.  Prior to the Obama Administration’s 
statement in 2015 the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC 
ITE) was developed in 2013, allowing for streamlined information sharing across 
agencies. Despite this, the lack of agency cooperation was not seriously addressed until 
after the release of the 2015 National Security Strategy. This further supports Crenshaw’s 
points of failings in the implementation of policy.  
Inter-agency cooperation is necessary for an effective defense against cyberthreats 
and nuclear terrorism. There is a clear trend in an increasing number of agencies dealing 
with these issues , and, as a result, the expansion of bureaucracy could be a limitation on 
a proactive response to cybersecurity and nuclear security concerns from terrorist 
organizations if not informed via proper intelligence and allowing for intelligence to be 
shared (See Figure C). The inefficiency of the diffusion of responsibility is supported by 
the findings of Crenshaw in terms of policy implementation and again by Allison where 
weaknesses in reactive responses reside. This lack of cooperation was highlighted a 
decade prior to the Obama Administration addressing the issue, where the House of 
Representatives had addressed the issue, stating “Given the U.S. agencies that are 
responsible for the programs that compromise a defense in depth and the geographic span 
of the activities, the nation’s efforts to counter nuclear terrorism must be formulated and 
implemented within an overarching, integrated, global architecture. Given the size and 
complexity of the endeavor, this architecture must be based on a systematic assessment of 
risks vs. investments'' (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005, 13). This shows that the 
issue of inter-agency cooperation is not new, and the multi-agency effort must be 
addressed with multi-agency cooperation. With an increase in terrorist attacks globally 
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between 2005 and the White House’s 2015 statement shows the gaps in cooperation to be 
detrimental to the security of the United States. While the White House addressed 
national security particularly in regards to terrorism in 2015, the prospect of Nuclear 
Terrorism being subject to the same weaknesses was still identified previously. This was 
clearly identified in 2005 when the House Committee on Homeland Security and 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack stated “But the real key to 
countering nuclear terrorism is effective coordination among all of the agencies with 
responsibilities for this exceedingly difficult problem” (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2005, 13). 
Although there was a clear rise in intelligence agency participation following the 
2016 cybersecurity breaches (see Figure C), further involvement of the intelligence 
community in terms of sharing information with other relevant agencies in a more 
proactive manner would enable a stronger defense system for addressing cyber threats 
and nuclear terrorism. The intelligence community is in the best position to complement 
cyber and nuclear deterrence because of their significantly more advanced technological 
expertise, necessary for addressing the rapid pace of cyber developments, as well as 
providing the underpinning intelligence for operations and defense systems to be 
effective via quantifiable data providing a capability to address milestone reviews. This 
would enhance proactive defense measures against threats to nuclear and cybersecurity 
from terrorist organizations and embolden a more well-informed inter-agency process for 
the application of national strategy using deterrence. Although the deterrence theory in 
itself does not call for cooperation, due to the lack of transnational norms, cooperation of 
an internal as well as external nature is necessary for establishing operational intelligence 
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and guidelines for other agencies to proceed, in the future, effectively in preventing 
nuclear terrorism and protecting against cyber threats. 
Conclusion 
Through this research, there is evidence that deterrence theory has a place in the 
future of strategic U.S. national security among policy-makers. As deterrence has 
historically and currently continues to inform evolving strategies for a variety of 
emerging threats, deterrence theory has shown to be capable of adapting to technological 
advancement. The advancement and proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities must be 
addressed in a proactive manner, as terrorist organizations continue to gain more 
competitive capabilities. With this advancement, the use of deterrence by policy-makers 
will be critical in formulating effective strategic guidelines in order to protect against 
cyber threat and nuclear terrorism. While these policy-makers are important in 
responding to emerging threats, it is equally, if not more so, important that policy-makers 
possess a full understanding of emerging technology, threats, and the capabilities and 
resources that are provided by a variety of bureaucratic agencies. This thesis has 
determined that the federal agencies encompassing the intelligence community are the 
most capable of guiding and informing policy-makers and other responsible agencies in 
the chain of implementing both policy and operations supporting the goals of policy-
makers.  
One of the weaknesses of this study is the number and type of documents 
reviewed. The sample size for this study was small because of a lack of public 
department-specific or agency policies that reflect ongoing implementation of relevant 
federal agencies. As a result, the congressional hearings, GAO report, and executive 
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strategy statements were necessary for formulating an understanding of the status of 
nuclear terrorism and cybersecurity through the perspective of legislators. This is a 
weakness in that although being informed by experts, the legislators themselves still lack 
a clear understanding of details and emerging threats due to the lack of technical 
expertise or national security issues being only a subset of legislator responsibilities. This 
means that while the hearings are important to understanding the policy-making process, 
the content could be misinformed in comparison to the understandings provided directly 
from responsible federal bureaucratic agencies. In addition, the policy-making process is 
slow and through the findings of this thesis, largely responsive, meaning that the 
accuracy of information to date could be incorrect due to the fast pacing at which 
technological developments and emerging threats shift. The analysis of this thesis led to 
the understanding that there is a lack of clear division of responsibility among competing 
federal agencies, however the inability to address internal agency reports constituted a 
limitation of the findings of this study. Another weakness in this study was that as the 
documents became closer to the present day, many critical responses and sections 
between legislators and agency personnel remain redacted from public record as of the 
time of conducting the research. The presence of this redaction becomes particularly clear 
in 2018. In addition, due to the fast pace at which cyber-related developments move, it is 
unclear that within the two years between the dates of the documents and when this study 
took place, if policy has become more responsive or proactive. The lack of 
information/data could have the potential to alter the findings of this study. As 
information security, or redaction, continues to be a key pillar of nuclear defense, a lack 
of publicly available information could be a potential sign of further efforts at 
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maintaining security, however it clearly functions as a limiting factor as to the depth of 
this study.  
 As the development of deterrence theory has evolved as nuclear security priorities 
shifted, one could expect issues involving deterrence and cyberspace to follow a similar 
trend in evolution. It is clear that deterrence theory still remains a major strategy 
employed by federal agencies and legislators when tackling cyber threats. Just as 
deterrence was used to address nuclear security, one could make similar assertions that 
the use of deterrence theory to address threats from cyberspace will follow a similar 
progression of establishing transnational norms and dealing with rational actors, with 
addressing critical gaps and strategies, prior to progressing into dealing with the more 
asymmetric implications and employers of cyber threats. However, with the asymmetric 
nature of the threat being employed by an asymmetric force, the use of cyberwarfare by 
terrorist organizations enables terrorists to maintain a rival capability with established 
nation-states. This appears to be the trend currently, with the beginnings of a phase two 
era of deterrence in transnational talks and an increasing occurrence of phase two 
deterrence appearing in U.S. policy. However, the application of deterrence theory is 
limited to the speed at which legislators and agencies can produce policy, agreements, 
and build defenses, a speed that drastically lags behind the progression of technological 
innovation. Thus, although deterrence has shown to be successful to address nuclear 
issues, the prospect of a lack of success in its application to cybersecurity seems to have  
less to do with the lack of deterrence as a viable strategy and more to do with the status-
quo pacing of building and developing solutions through policy-makers and distributing 
these solutions across multiple agencies. As a result, deterrence theory is still valuable in 
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addressing cyber threats, and in particularly their extension of threats to other areas, such 
as nuclear terrorism. However, the process of implementing and reviewing deterrence-
based strategies must be done at a pace matching the progression and spread of 
technological capabilities. 
 Given this, the Intelligence Community is the best candidate among federal 
agencies in the U.S. to support building effective cyber threat policy using deterrence for 
issues such as nuclear terrorism, as they possess the greater qualities of understanding the 
technological progression inherent to cyber threats as well as possess the greatest 
capacity at providing the necessary intelligence and guidance to existing agencies when 
dealing with the future of asymmetric threats. As literature regarding nuclear terrorism 
and cyberthreats continues to grow, there are many other questions guide further 
research. Understanding how strategists view asymmetric threats versus traditional inter-
state conflict is important in developing sound national strategies that can guide the 
response to creating policy to address future threats. The establishment of norms for 
upcoming technologies is critical for curbing the growing threat and pacing at which 
cyberwarfare capabilities are developed and distributed. Determining the limitations of 
deterrence theory given a lack of rational actors, or indifferent threats, is necessary in 
future additions to third wave deterrence theory literature in order to better inform the 
limitations of deterrence theory. When addressing federal agencies, the question of how 
to promote and ensure inter-agency cooperation is important to the future success of 
national security issues as conflict and threats become more asymmetrical in nature. In 
promoting the further involvement of intelligence agencies, how can intelligence 
agencies be more effective in cooperating with other agencies? Can federal agencies 
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gather intelligence and operate effectively while not infringing on privacy and could 
these agencies be in a position to protect privacy without hampering security? Does the 
government have a responsibility to limit technological progression in the spirit of 
national security?  
There is an abundance of research to be done as it relates to future applications of 
deterrence theory by policymakers for addressing nuclear security, cybersecurity, and 
terrorism. Overall, the findings of this paper address that the phases of deterrence theory 
applied to nuclear terrorism by policy-makers has shifted as a result of an increase in 
cyberthreats. In addition, the lack of cooperation among federal agencies to address 
cyberthreats can best be fulfilled by further integration and cooperation with intelligence 
agencies. Moving forward, it would be beneficial to review further documents as new 
technologies and threats emerge, necessitating new policy, and previously redacted 
information becomes declassified. As cyber threats and cyberwarfare capabilities 
continue to be developed and become more complex, yet available, it is paramount that 
nuclear security and policy be adaptable to these new and emerging threats. As non-state 
actors, such as terrorist organizations, continue to seek interest in the prospect of nuclear 
terrorism, U.S. national security policy must be able to adapt and be executed effectively 
as threats continue to emerge. 
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APPENDIX A: CODE SHEET 
Date of Coding: 
Name of Coder: 
Sampling Information | ID#: 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Document Title: 
 
Agency/Branch: 
 
Subcommittee: 
 
Date: 
 
Asset/System of Concern: 
 
Non-State Actor Addressed: 
Yes/No 
(Name of non-state actors, terrorist, group, etc.) 
 
Cyber Threats Addressed: 
Yes/No 
If Yes,          # of Times 
mentioned 
Phishing _________________________________________________________ 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) _____________________________________ 
Malware __________________________________________________________ 
Web Attacks_______________________________________________________ 
Denial of Service (DoS)_______________________________________________ 
DDoS (DDoS)______________________________________________________ 
Eavesdropping _____________________________________________________ 
Man in the Middle (MitM) _____________________________________________ 
Insider ____________________________________________________________ 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) ______________________________________________ 
Quantum __________________________________________________________ 
Non-Specific (Name if provided)________________________________________  
Quotes 
(Quote of Threat Addressed) 
 
Future Threats Addressed? 
Yes/No 
 
Enforcement Guidelines 
Yes/No 
 
Reference to Past Policy  
Yes/No 
Positive/ Negative 
 
Phase of Deterrence Theory 
1/2/3/4         Type of Deterrence:___________________   Target of Deterrence:____________________ 
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Figure A 
 
 
Number of Times Cyber Threats were mentioned by legislators per document by 
month/year. 
 
Figure B 
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Figure C 
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Figure D 
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